Just over one hundred days into Donald J. Trump’s return to the presidency, the contours of a new international economic landscape are beginning to take shape. While many expected a reprise of his earlier trade agenda, this iteration bears a different imprint—more deliberate, more coherent, and grounded in a clearer political logic.

At the heart of this evolving strategy is Stephen Miran, a traditionally trained economist now serving as Director of the Council of Economic Advisers. His November 2024 report initially attracted little fanfare. But over time, it has emerged as a key document in understanding the administration’s evolving trade philosophy. Its unassuming title—A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trade System—belies its deeper implications.

Miran is not merely critiquing globalization. He is outlining a blueprint for redefining America’s role in global commerce. Rather than operating within multilateral frameworks, he argues for a more assertive use of U.S. hegemonic power—leveraging monetary adjustments, active fiscal policy, and tightly integrating trade with security and diplomacy.

This vision doesn’t exist in a vacuum. The global economic order has shown signs of erosion for more than a decade. The post-Cold War consensus—rooted in liberalized trade, far-flung supply chains, and the financial centrality of the U.S. dollar—has begun to fray. The U.S.-China trade decoupling, pandemic-driven disruptions, and sanctions tied to conflicts like the war in Ukraine have laid bare these vulnerabilities.

Miran’s proposals have found resonance. Among his most provocative assertions: a strong dollar is not a virtue but a liability. He argues it suppresses exports, sustains chronic deficits, and renders the U.S. dependent on foreign capital. His solution: a managed correction, unilateral if necessary, akin to the 1985 Plaza Accord—albeit reimagined in bilateral terms.

Meanwhile, the administration has begun deploying tariffs with surgical precision. These are not crude protectionist instruments or erratic provocations. They are being used tactically, targeted at strategic sectors, reshaping tariffs from ideological tools into operational levers.

Miran also champions a new Washington orthodoxy: that defense agreements should come with economic obligations. If a nation benefits from American military protection, it should avoid practices that harm U.S. industry. What once might have seemed a coercive threat is now reframed as a pragmatic expectation.

It is in this context that rumors of a possible “Mar-a-Lago Accord” have begun to circulate. Though no draft has been released, the initiative reportedly aims to overhaul global trade rules—reducing dollar dependency, introducing new financial instruments (potentially digital), and embedding economic flexibility within a more national-interest-aligned framework.

Underlying it all is a bold premise: that the United States possesses the structural power to reshape the global system without triggering collapse. Some see the move as perilous. Others, as overdue. What sets Miran’s doctrine apart is its unapologetic revival of economic statecraft. After decades dominated by efficiency metrics and multilateral consensus, Washington appears to be reverting to strategic control—if not outright economic nationalism.

This is not a call for autarky. It is a call to wield economic tools in pursuit of national purpose. At its core is the ethos of America First—recast not as a slogan, but as a governing principle.

Miran’s approach is rooted in a stark but simple premise: the state is not an arbiter among interests but the steward of national power in a competitive world. Whether this pivot leads the world’s most powerful economy to a stronger position—or hastens the unraveling of the global order it once championed—remains uncertain. But one thing is clear: tariffs, bilateralism, and trade realignment are no longer temporary trends. They are signals of a new era, unfolding swiftly, reshaping the global landscape before our eyes.

All this—barely a hundred days in.